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A distributed architecture design which interconnects terminals, microcomputers, and
larger host computers must eventually face the question “who has access to this system?”
Potential subscribers who do not have an appreciation for their need for security run the
risk of a intermixed intercommunication network. There are typically additional
responsibilities and security-related concerns about having controlled access. The
introduction of operationally flexible microcomputers into systems also introduces a
greater distribution of critical control tasks and greater access to sensitive communications.
The classic solution would be to physically separate and thus electrically isolate inputs,
outputs and the necessary computing hardware. Typically separate and dedicated
connections would be used to securely pass data and control signals between the
equipment. However, as a result of state of the art hardware design and software
programming microcomputer technology is already waiting with programmable
inputs/outputs, layered protocols, local area networks and powerful computing operations.
Modularity, multi-tasking functions and conceptual system engineering have all
contributed to the aforementioned integrated applications. Thus the need for an access
control system which can be integrated into every connection of the system is inevitable.
Microcomputer tasks are usually programmed to be very efficient in accomplishing the
assigned job. By designing a Separation Kernel with compartmentation and guarded
privilege or discretionary data base access the assigned jobs can be performed without
regard to security concerns. The resulting isolated data base could be containerized within
the particular microprocessor RAM by using a variant addressing mechanism unique to
each terminal. One example is the handling of both secure and clear digitized voice within
a microprocessor based terminal. A Seperation Kernel directs the RAM access through a
guard. This guard can be implemented either in hardware or software or a combination of
both. However, verification of software separation is a task of varying difficulty. Whereas,
hardware verification is relatively straightforward.
Maintaining the isolation of secure/clear (sometimes labeled Red/Black separation) over a
common transmission medium requires careful design. In a distributed system, the
definition of a connection-oriented TRANSMISSION SECURITY or TRANSEC based on
initiator-connector protocol has many advantages. First it is relatively easy to appreciate
from the users viewpoints. Secondly, if cryptographic devices are employed such as a
Federal Data Encryption Standard (DES) implemented algorithm then mechanisms are
definable for both initialization and synchronization of discretionary connections. One such
application is illustrated in Figure 1 Security Protocol Design. Access to a connection can
be granted or denied at the discretion of the initiator of the connection. The design protects
against unauthorized intercept. The environment is defined to be nonmalicious i.e. no user
is performing traffic analysis or imitative deception.
The DES design was chosen as the cover/decover pseudorandom algorithm
implementation because of its validated correctness, its availability without T/SEC
nomenclature and its 256 or over 72 quadrillion possible encryption DES keys. The security
protocol is built into a custom gate-array LSI and requires an initiator (m) of both secure
and privacy connections to distribute its unique DES key and acknowledges by receiving
back a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is a function of the connectors’
serial number SN (n), the received DES key (m), an initialization vector IV, and the DES
algorithm itself. The MAC is then checked independently by the initiator. An audit count is
kept by the initiator and when a connection is terminated the DES key of the connector is
zeroized and the audit count adjusted. Connections are quickly made, authenticated and
broken via the control bus. The physical separation of DES key transaction ports from
distributed data bus ports prevent input/output failures which bypass security protocol.
The security protocol involves both operator and machine interactions. In order to ensure a
secure connection the operator must not be allowed to bypass or ignore the operational
steps. This implies that simple, well understood steps are needed and any default condition
is safeguarded. The sequence of operational steps necessary to establish and maintain
secure digital data on data bus is shown in the Security Operational Model flowcharts
Figure 2 and Figure 3. This operational flow is dichotomized between initiator (Figure 2)
and the corresponding connector action (Figure 3). Operator and machine actions are
included in both cases. The load of a operational connectivity plan into each user terminal
represents the initialization of the system. The supplied communication plan includes the
user dependent connectivity matrix and the set of DES keys used to establish a user
initiated connection. This communication plan is loaded via the control bus. A unique key
is allocated for each of the permissable secure interconnections that can be supported by a
particular user at any given time. Each key that is loaded into an individual terminal is
checked for parity. If a parity error occurs, the operator is alerted and then takes corrective
action by requesting a key reload.
At this point, the central initialization is complete and the initiator is ready to commence
channel intialization. The initiating operator selects a communication channel and
exercises the secure/clear option. The channel is checked against the connectivity matrix to
verify that selected channel is a permissable interconnection. If a secure connection is
required, the initiator sends a DES key via the control bus to all intended user connections.
The recipient connector acknowledges by sending a message authentication code (MAC).
This MAC is generated using the received key to encrypt the connector’s serial numer.
The initator then determines if the proper recipient connector has been contacted by
deciphering the MAC and checking the received serial number against the allowable
connection list. If a MAC error occurs, the operator is alerted and reestablishment of
connection is attempted. At the time the DES key is received by the connector, a
timeout/zeroize safeguard mechanism is activiated. This mechanism will zeroize the
received connection key if the connector fails to respond to the initiation before a specified
time has elapsed. Illuminated security indicators alert the operators at both the initiator and
connector ends that secure communications are underway.
The initiator accounts for each connection key that is sent by using a key count register.
This register is incremented each time the initiator sends a key to a particular connector.
When a connection is broken, the initiator zerorizes the connection key at each user
location and decrements the key count register. This audit trail mechanism prevents the
erroneous storage of connection keys at any connector.
A distributed secure/clear architecture has been described that provides a limited, but
useful form of connection oriented secure operation. The limitations are mainly in personal
security controls and in distributing the DES key. Because the initiator itself controls
discretionary access, the system must have some form of complete mediation over all of
the terminals. A separate control bus has been provided which is used to initially load
unique DES keys to each terminal. The central controller used to accomplish this task
mediates individual secure access control. Through denial of a Des key the central
controller inhibits any terminal from initiating a secure connection without proper
authorization. If a terminal is removed from the system and a replacement terminal
connected then the central controller must be notified.
Hughes MSD is actively pursuing the application of computer security architectures to
systems containing microcomputers, terminals and intermixed data transmission mediums.
Operational environments include both airborne and naval ship intercommunications.
Distributed networks such as local area networks are rapidly contributing to the
requirements of access control and secure connectivity. Standardization of secure
algorithms is quite important to the further development of baselined generic systems.
Enhancements can be developed for future multi-level security networks integrating both
cryptographic and trusted software solutions.
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Figure 1 - Security Protocol Design
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